

TOMAHAWK DIPLOMACY AND U. S. NATIONAL SECURITY

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major Roger A. Pretsch
Aviation**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff
College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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
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
Major Roger A. Pretsch

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Approved by:



LTCOL Melvin G. Spiese, MS Monograph Director



LTC Robin P. Swan, MMAS Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Director, Graduate Degree
Program

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ABSTRACT

Tomahawk Diplomacy and US National Security by MAJ Roger A. Pretsch, USA, 36 pages.

The modern term, creeping into the American lexicon, "Tomahawk Diplomacy" has come to represent a form of limited military response where the National Command Authority (NCA) employs cruise missiles and other high technology weapons as a means of enforcing American foreign policy and protecting US security. Although this form of response normally includes an array of precision weapons and delivery systems, cruise missiles have become a most visible and highly publicized form of limited military response. The NCA relies heavily on cruise missiles as a strategic asset. So predominant are these weapons that cruise missiles are specifically mentioned in both the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy as an integral part of nearly every military response contingency. The US is employing these weapons with increasing regularity and is expected to continue to rely on this form of response in the future.

This monograph explores the implications of employing cruise missiles as a means of limited military response in the pursuit of US national security objectives or imposition of US foreign policy. This monograph uses the three most recent US use of cruise missiles as case studies and analyzes them against a defined set of criteria in order to identify the strategic implications of their use. This research uses the instruments of national power as criteria to develop a framework for analysis. Publications from various academic and media sources form the body of knowledge necessary to develop a coherent balance of arguments for and against the use of cruise missile diplomacy. The intent of this monograph is to determine if the use of cruise missiles is restricting limited military response options to operational planners, and provides a framework for identifying and understanding strategic implications.

The analysis shows that Tomahawk cruise missiles provide the military with a highly versatile weapon, but because of cruise missile technological capability, political leaders are tempted to use them to achieve a relatively low risk limited strikes in the face of failed diplomacy and nonfunctional foreign policy. Tomahawk cruise missiles themselves do not constrain the operational planner, but the capabilities of cruise missiles allow political leaders to rapidly pursue military options that often include a great deal of political influence in the conduct of the operation. Due to an aversion to sustain US and adversary casualties and an interest in limiting collateral damage, political leaders often place limits and constraints on the military planner. These aversions stem from the fundamental and relative importance of the issue at stake. The limits and constraints imposed by the political leadership hamper the operational planner in developing a comprehensive and effective military response to achieve stated political objectives.

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Major Roger A. Pretsch, USA

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INTRODUCTION

As the United States confronts a truly revolutionary era, the nation must have the courage to see the world as it really is: a world abundant with opportunities, but also one beset by challenges; a world in which conflict remains a way of life for many nations.

-General Carl E Vuono¹

The modern term, creeping into the American lexicon, "Tomahawk Diplomacy" has come to represent a form of limited military response where the National Command Authority (NCA) employs cruise missiles and other high technology weapons as a means of enforcing American foreign policy and protecting US security. Although this form of response normally includes an array of precision weapons and delivery systems, cruise missiles have become a most visible and highly publicized form of limited military response. The NCA relies heavily on cruise missiles as a strategic asset. So predominant are these weapons that cruise missiles are specifically mentioned in both the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy as an integral part of nearly every military response contingency.² The US is employing these weapons with increasing regularity and is expected to continue to rely on this form of response in the future.

Born out of the cold war, cruise missiles were originally designed as a nuclear delivery system capable of flying with great precision at low levels to their intended targets. The development of such a weapon was in response to the technological advancements of Soviet tactical and strategic air defense systems in the 50's and 60's.³ The technological capability of the cruise missile dramatically increased the likelihood of successful target engagement against the Soviet extensive and comprehensive air defense

network. Aircrew survivability was an obvious residual benefit by enabling precision engagement from a variety of remote launch systems. In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense directed the majority of the cruise missile stockpile be reconfigured to deliver conventional high explosive munitions.⁴ Capable of being launched from air, land, and sea, cruise missiles have a mission radius of 1000 statute miles. Cruise missiles are a versatile weapon capable of destroying a variety of stationary targets. This relatively low risk method of remotely employed precision engagement provides the US military with a striking capability that meets the current administration's requirements for limited collateral damage and minimal risk to US forces.⁵ Cruise missiles used exclusively, or in conjunction with other military weapons, provide the operational military planner with a myriad of employment options. Beyond the technical aspects of planning the employment of these weapons, it is imperative that planners understand the strategic implications of using this form of military response. What are the strategic implications of using cruise missiles? Is tomahawk diplomacy restricting the limited response options available to operational planners? From a strategic standpoint, is the use of cruise missiles an effective form or response against rogue powers threatening US national interests and security? There are some very strong arguments for using these weapons, but how effective are they? What perceptions, both foreign and domestic, does the US generate when using these weapons? What does the US use of cruise missiles mean to the rogue state leader?

This monograph explores the implications of employing cruise missiles as a means of limited military response in the pursuit of US national security objectives or imposition of US foreign policy. This monograph uses the three most recent US

employment of cruise missiles as case studies and analyzes them against a defined set of criteria in order to identify the strategic implications of their use. This research uses the instruments of national power as criteria to develop a framework for analysis.

Publications from various academic and media sources form the body of knowledge necessary to develop a coherent balance of arguments for and against the use of cruise missile diplomacy. The intent of this monograph is to determine if the use of cruise missiles is restricting limited military response options to operational planners, and provides a framework for identifying and understanding strategic implications.

This analysis systematically reviews the 1998 cruise missile attack of Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan to identify the strategic implications of cruise missile employment in limited military strikes in order to determine if this form of military response limits operational planners. The analysis will show that Tomahawk cruise missiles provide the military with a highly versatile weapon, but because of cruise missile technological capability, political leaders are tempted to use them to achieve a relatively low risk limited strikes in the face of failed diplomacy and nonfunctional foreign policy.⁶

Tomahawk cruise missiles themselves do not constrain the operational planner, but the capabilities of cruise missiles allow political leaders to rapidly pursue military options that often include a great deal of political influence in the conduct of the operation. In pursuit of national objectives, political leaders sometimes look to the military to perform military operations intended to coerce an adversary or that are punitive in nature. When this option becomes necessary, often the objective is less than of vital national interest and does not warrant the effort associated with a full-scale military response.⁷ When this occurs, political leaders sometimes direct the military to perform combat operations of

relatively low risk referred to as limited strikes.⁸ Characteristically, limited strikes are strictly controlled operations focused on specific targets and normally of short duration. While political leaders desire potent military effects against the adversary, there is also an interest in avoiding the loss of human life and an intent to limit the collateral damage. Cruise missiles serve this purpose by providing a precision weapon with limited effects that is employed with great standoff capability for the military forces involved. Limits and constraints are imposed upon the military planner because the limited political objectives impact on the nature of the operation, resulting in limited effects. The limits and constraints imposed by the political leadership hamper the operational planner in developing a comprehensive and effective military response to achieve stated political objectives.

Four basic concepts are essential to the development of this monograph. The first concept is the Instruments of National Power. In this analysis, the instruments of national power serves two purposes. First, the instruments of national power provide a basis for the discussion of strategic level considerations. Second, the instruments of national power also serves as the decision criteria for this study. The next concept is US National Security Interests. US national security interests is this administration's defined security goals that relate directly to the nation's fundamental and enduring needs.⁹ The concept of national security interests is essential to this study because it provides the basic justification for applying military for to certain international situations. The concept of limited military strike is defined in the National Military Strategy. While the US military is capable of a myriad of operational employment possibilities, limited military strikes

have in the last decade become a more common form of military response. This concept is important because it aids the analysis in defining the situations where limited military response is necessary. The last concept pertinent to this study is Tomahawk Diplomacy. While the US military possess a variety forces capable of conducting limited strikes, the term Tomahawk Diplomacy has become synonymous with the use of precision weapons as a means of imposing US foreign policy. This concept is the essence of the study. These four concepts are vital to this study and form the basis of analysis.

The National Security Strategy outlines the interests, threats and policies key to developing and maintaining national security and prosperity. Essential to the security of the United States are those resources available to the state by which security can be achieved. Commonly referred to as the *instruments of national power*, these resources outline a complex array of systems and programs designed to protect the United States domestically and internationally.¹⁰ The United States is prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors as necessary to ensure achieving those interests vital to the nation.¹¹ The four recognized instruments of national power are *Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic*.¹² The art of diplomacy is the communication and relationship activities conducted by sovereign states. The informational aspect of national power is the state's ability to develop internal and external perceptions. Simultaneously, the state conducts informational efforts by critically analyzing other state's informational efforts in order to achieve national advantage.¹³ The military aspect of national power is defined as the nation's armed ability to impose foreign policy and protect national security. The military aspect of national power includes a vast spectrum of responses and forms of deterrence.

The economic aspect of national power is the capability of a nation to use the international commerce system to develop, achieve, and sustain national interests. The instruments of national power involve physical resources and provide the state with the means by which national security objectives are obtained and maintained.¹⁴

The objectives of national security are identified in the national security strategy. The goal of the national security strategy is to ensure the protection of our nation's fundamental and enduring needs. In the development of a national security strategy the NCA identifies national interests and objectives. The two basic forms of national interests are vital interests and important national interests. Vital interests are those of broad importance to the survival, safety and vitality of the nation.¹⁵ Physical security of the national borders and infrastructure, safety of citizens and economic well being are examples of vital national interests. Important national interests do not affect national security but involve the character of the world structure, interrelations and vitality.¹⁶ US operations in Haiti and NATO operations in Bosnia are stated relevant examples. The national security interests are not limited to the two basic forms, but do directly apply to this study. While this nation identifies security interests and objectives and are willing to commit national treasure and resources to achieve these objectives, there are other nations and organizations with interests and objectives in direct contract to our own.

Opposing national interests, the national security strategy identifies five categories of threats. The threats to US interests include regional or state-centered threats, transnational threats, failed states, spread of dangerous technologies, and foreign intelligence collection.¹⁷ Only the first three threats are directly related to this study. Regional threats possess the capability to threaten vital interests through coercion or

aggression. Regional threats threaten the sovereignty of the US, its allies, and access to international resources. The national security strategy identifies Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as examples of regional threats.¹⁸ Transnational threats such as terrorism, international crime, illicit drug and arms trafficking threaten interests, citizens and national sovereignty. States unable to provide the basic services, opportunities and governance to their population are known as failed states. Failed states threaten regional stability and therefore affect national interests.¹⁹ This monograph utilizes three case studies to illustrate these threats to US national security. The US employs all instruments of national power to combat these threats, but it is the application of military power that is the primary interest of this study.

The US military plays an essential role in protecting national interests. The armed forces help to deter aggression, promote regional stability, and serve as role models for militaries of emerging democracies.²⁰ The US military's credible warfighting capability and the declaratory policy communicate to adversaries the risks of threatening US national interests.²¹ Not all threats to national interests warrant a full-scale military response. When military force is required, most often the NCA selects a limited military strike to impose foreign policy.²² Limited military response is defined in the National Security Strategy as a small-scale contingency.²³ While small-scale contingencies encompass a full range of operations, the military operation referred to limited strikes is the most applicable to this study. When employed, limited strikes are intended to intervene when the costs and risks are commensurate with the stakes involved. There is also an assumption that these operations are of relatively short duration, sustain limited collateral damage to the threat, and are conducted with minimal risk to American lives

and lives of our adversaries.²⁴

The cruise missile has usurped other traditional forms of military response such as attack aircraft and naval gunfire.²⁵ Since its first use in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States has come to rely extensively on the Tomahawk cruise missile as a primary military instrument to impose foreign policy and achieve political goals. The term *Gunboat diplomacy* of the nineteenth and early twentieth century has been replaced by *Tomahawk diplomacy* in the American lexicon to represent the technologically advanced US military's ability to impose a seemingly risk-free punch to adversaries threatening US interests and security.²⁶ This weapon has great utility in achieving strategic objectives while maintaining popular administration policy. The current administration maintains an integrated approach policy to bring together all appropriate forms of national power needed to achieve national security objectives.²⁷ A key aspect of this policy is the will to use the resources necessary to achieve national objectives insofar as the costs and risks are commensurate with the objectives at stake.²⁸ The issue of risk plays an important part in the development of military operations. Political leaders consider military operations when normal diplomatic efforts have proven unsuccessful. When this occurs, political leaders often desire a military response of limited effect and employed in such a way to place a specific amount of pressure on the adversary as a means to persuade or punish without escalating the situation beyond control. Current US policy also dictates that military means will avoid US military casualties as well as casualties to US adversaries.²⁹ It is the balance of costs and risks with objectives that underscores the utility of the Tomahawk cruise missile. It is not the intent of this paper to determine if the recent military actions could have been accomplished at a reduced monetary cost or by other

means. The intent of this study is to determine if the use of cruise missiles have fulfilled the strategic role that was previously reserved for more traditional means of military response and identify potential strategic limitations of their use for the operational planner.

Since their premier employment in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Tomahawk missile has surpassed other more traditional forms of limited military strikes. The intent of this study is to determine if current US strategic use of Tomahawk cruise missiles is restricting options available to operational planners in planning a limited military strike. This study examines the three most recent uses of cruise missiles as case studies. In the past year, the President of the United States ordered the use of cruise missiles on three specific occasions. While the first incidence was literally cancelled at the last minute, the other two cases were well publicized. As this study will determine, these three cases serve as a basis for the analysis to discern the implications of Tomahawk cruise missile employment, and the potential constraints operational planners must overcome when developing a limited military strike option.

After a series of failed attempts by UN weapons inspectors to gain access to select Iraqi facilities, the United States initiated an attack on Iraqi industrial facilities identified as part Iraq's program of developing weapons of mass destruction. The attack was cancelled literally at the last minute when Saddam Hussein capitulated to the UN demands. Although the strikes were not executed, the implications of American unilateral decision to use force on Iraq and the decision for this type of military response as well as the selection of targets makes this case worthy of analysis.

In response to the bombing of two US embassies in Africa, America attacked a

Sudanese pharmaceutical plant suspected of developing lethal chemical agents and suspected terrorist training facilities in Afghanistan. The pharmaceutical plant and terrorist training facilities were alleged to be associated with the Saudi Arabian terrorist Osama bin Laden. Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from US ships off the coastlines of the two countries. The attack lasted just a few hours, but demonstrated the versatility of the cruise missile and America's ability to maneuver throughout the world and act unilaterally in order impose foreign policy. The President ordered these attacks as the initiation of increased direct activities to combat terrorism. This case is particularly important because of the scrutiny of evidence used to justify the attack. After much analysis there remains a great deal of question about the timing and justification of the attack.

While The US Congress prepared impeachment charges against President Clinton, Saddam Hussein again refused UN inspection teams access to sites suspected of contributing to the Iraqi weapons program. Operation Desert Fox lasted seventy hours and attacked one hundred targets. Along with other high technology weapons, some 418 cruise missiles were fired against various targets. The three-day operation was hailed a success and gained temporary access to Iraqi military industrial facilities. Since the attack, the Iraqi leader has become more defiant. During the writing of this research, American military forces are engaging in limited strikes against air defense systems along Iraq's northern no-fly zone. Again, the timing of the attack, the selected targets and the repercussions of this last cruise missile attack are instrumental to this analysis.

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

It is reasonable to assume that the United States will continue using cruise missiles as a form of limited strikes. This study analyzes the US recent employment of cruise missiles to identify the implications of their use and highlights the potential limitations imposed on operational planners when developing limited strike contingencies. Cruise missile employment appears both politically and militarily to be a relatively low risk form of military response. Operational planners must be aware of the strategic aspects and limitations of these high technology weapons and be prepared to accurately advise strategic and operational leaders. This study systematically analyzes recent cruise missile use in the achievement of various political and military objectives. As discussed earlier, the instruments of national power serves as the evaluation criteria, and the three most recent US use of cruise missiles as the case studies for the analysis.

The analysis begins with an individual discussion of the four instruments of national power. The discussion covers the varying aspects associated with the instrument as it relates to national security objectives. Following the introductory discussion, the three case studies are individually analyzed and assessed for their accomplishment of national security objectives. The study generates a general assessment of the success or failure of the use of cruise missiles to attain national security objectives and recognizes the operational limitations imposed on planners when developing limited strike options. While it is difficult to take the three case studies in isolation and use them as the total justification for the findings of this analysis, the reality is that further studies of other

cases will find similar results. This analysis will not chronologically review each case, but will discuss only those key events that relate to the criteria as it is being studied.

This study used numerous sources in order to provide the documentation necessary to conduct an analysis of this subject. Political and military documents supply the cornerstone of the discussion of national security objectives and the instruments of national power. Public sources provide a basis for the historical discussion of the development of cruise missiles and political implications of their use, and media sources provide the details of the three case studies used in the analysis. During the research phase of this study, it became clear that government agencies were interested in maintaining a high level of security pertaining to the technical use of cruise missiles. It is the intent of this study not to use technical resources in order to retain the unclassified nature of this research. While there are many possible combinations of criteria, and resources related to this subject, the analytical structure of this study is meant to address the known implications associated with cruise missile employment.

Essential to the strategic orientation of this study, the instruments of national power represent the various resources and actions nation's use to achieve national objectives. This study analyzes the use of cruise missiles from a strategic aspect in order to develop an operational appreciation of their employment. The instruments of national power encompass those various forms of activities nation's conduct in the process of normal operations. While military action is not considered normal or common, it does represent a very real and viable form or response in the process of obtaining and securing national security objectives. The following criteria are not intended to be all encompassing. There are many technical and military aspects of the use of cruise missiles

that this study will not address. The instruments of national power are used to highlight the strategic aspects of limited military response in terms appreciable to the operational planner.

Diplomacy is the art of communications and relationships in the global environment.³⁰ States conduct diplomatic operations in various forms in order to gain desired objectives. There are four basic forms of diplomatic activities. Negotiations, recognition, treaties and alliances make up the states common diplomatic activities.³¹ States strive to enhance prestige and credibility as a measure of success in the diplomatic arena. An integral part of diplomatic operations is the development of international relations.³² Developing and sustaining effective diplomatic relations is essential to attaining national objectives. While diplomatic operations include various types of actions, the development and maintenance of national prestige and credibility in international relations is essential to sustaining diplomatic effectiveness.³³ The US strives to maintain diplomatic effectiveness in the form of traditional diplomatic operations by employing all of the instruments of national power. This includes limited military strikes. This study first addresses the diplomatic success or failure of limited military actions involving recent US cruise missile employment. This analysis explores the case studies to assess the relative diplomatic effectiveness of limited cruise missile strikes in achieving stated national objectives. While the art of diplomacy covers a vast array of activities, this study focuses on the relative diplomatic effectiveness of cruise missile strikes and attempts to identify the diplomatic repercussions relating to such acts. For this analysis, diplomatic effectiveness is measured in terms of prestige and credibility and forms the basis of the diplomatic analysis. From an operational standpoint, this

portion of the analysis will highlight the repercussions of cruise missile employment from a diplomatic aspect.

The informational instrument of national power is the gathering, distribution, and application of information in the pursuit of attaining national objectives. Information operations intrinsically are related to the other three instruments of national power. Information operations figuratively tie the remaining three instruments and directly impacts on their potential for success. Information operations also include the management of information for internal government use, information exchange with allies, and the development of internal and external perceptions.³⁴ Governmental efforts to develop and maintain public support exemplify the information operations aspect of perception development. This study examines information management relating to cruise missile employment from both an internal agency perspective as well as the process of developing national support. The analytical assessment of the informational instrument of national power and its relation to tomahawk diplomacy is based on published documentation expressing the level of public support at the time of the case studies.

The nation's armed ability to impose foreign policy and protect national security defines the military instrument of national power. The military aspect of national power includes a vast spectrum of responses and forms of deterrence. Tomahawk diplomacy is categorized as a form of limited military response, and more specifically, a military strike. The military is the most physical instrument of national power and is employed to enforce national security objectives or impose foreign policy.³⁵ This examines the publicly stated military objectives of each case study and assesses the relative success. This analysis is intended to generate discussion regarding the relative success of cruise

missile employment at a strategic level and bring to focus the military implications of using these weapons.

The economic aspect of national power is the capability of a nation to use the international commerce system to develop, achieve, and sustain national objectives.³⁶ Military operations affect the US economy. Directly or indirectly, US military operations have economic implications. This study attempts to highlight the economic effects of cruise missile employment. While the operational planner is not concerned with national and international economic activities resulting from limited military operations, he should be aware of the diplomatic and political ties to the economy, and prepared to advise the operational leadership to the potential second and third order effects.

While a great deal of attention is given to the US's recent military actions and the use of cruise missiles in conducting limited strikes, the overall effectiveness of this form of response is increasingly being questioned.³⁷ It is imperative to critically analyze the effectiveness of these weapons when used in limited strikes as a means of achieving national objectives and impose foreign policy. The following analysis systematically explores recent examples of cruise missile diplomacy and evaluates these cases in terms of effectively achieving national objectives.

Of the four instruments of national power, the diplomatic analysis serves as greatest resource toward meeting the objectives of this study. While both the diplomatic and military analysis generate the main elements of discussion in this project, the diplomatic analysis is truly the heart of the strategic orientation and intent of this study. The resources available to generate the base of knowledge and discussion for this analysis are predominantly focused on the diplomatic aspects surrounding the case

studies. The amount of media coverage serves this analysis well because it allows for the development of the strategic appreciation and understanding of cruise missile employment.

The US Army defines diplomacy as the art of communications and relationships in the global environment.³⁸ Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refers to diplomacy as ideological pursuit of developing international relations.³⁹ As stated earlier, negotiations, recognition, treaties, and alliances make up the four aspects of diplomatic operations. Of the four aspects of diplomatic operations, negotiations and alliances are two aspects that most directly relate to the intent of this study. The US initially uses negotiations to resolve disputes with adversaries pursuing interests in conflict with US interests. Negotiations do not preclude the US from developing other contingencies, but does rely on the negotiation process as the primary means of resolving conflicts.⁴⁰ Alliances are used by nations with similar interests to increase power and present a common diplomatic front in negotiations.⁴¹ In a conflict, the US pursues the development of alliances to demonstrate solidarity among nations to an adversary. Historically, the US is prepared to conduct operations unilaterally, but prefers international support when actively pursuing national objectives. Diplomatic operations associated with conducting negotiations and developing alliances are consistent with the US's desire to maintain diplomatic effectiveness. All operations in pursuit of attaining national objectives, including limited military strikes, are related to diplomatic actions, and maintaining diplomatic effectiveness. The US depends on the US State Department and other agencies to maintain diplomatic effectiveness during the entire process of pursuing and attaining national objectives. Limited military strikes have potentially

positive and negative effect on diplomatic activities. This study explores the impact cruise missile strikes have on maintaining diplomatic effectiveness in the pursuit of stated national objectives. Of the three case studies used in this analysis, the cases dealing with the Iraq best demonstrate the diplomatic actions associated with limited military strikes. These cases provide the best analysis of diplomatic implications and directly supporting this study.

The analysis of the case studies demonstrates that diplomatic effectiveness suffer when diplomatic efforts fail and military options are employed as a means of coercion. This portion of the analysis demonstrates that limited strikes, specifically air strikes, are an ineffective means of coercion or punishment. Additionally, from a diplomatic standpoint, limited strikes are not effective against a country pursuing fundamental national interests. The long-term US prestige and credibility normally suffer whenever limited strikes are used as a means of persuasion or punishment in the absence of effective diplomatic follow-up. Limited cruise missile strikes potentially jeopardize the development and maintenance of international relations.

The US has had a long history of employing military resources in the pursuit of coercing an adversary into subjugating itself to US foreign policy.⁴² Relating to the case studies, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that the purpose of the military actions directed against Iraq was "to coerce" Saddam Hussein into complying with the terms of United Nations sanctions.⁴³ As a form of punishment against the terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, the US attacked a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory and terrorist training sites in Afghanistan.⁴⁴ The resources suggest that both operations failed in achieving their goals.⁴⁵ Following the December attack against Iraq intended to coerce

Saddam Hussein into complying with UN Sanctions, the result is that UN inspectors are still unable to resume their weapons inspections, and Iraq has increased the number of incursions across the no-fly zone.⁴⁶ Following the attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden's support from Muslim nations has increased and Laden himself has promised increased terrorist acts directed against Americans.⁴⁷ The US suffered a decrease in diplomatic effectiveness as a result of employing limited military strikes as a means of coercion. In all three cases, the US has ended in a more difficult diplomatic position following the 1998 cruise missile attacks.⁴⁸

There are three primary assessments that lead to the understanding that limited military strikes are ineffective as a means of coercion and punishment. First, limited strikes by nature are of short duration and focused on very specific targets. Limited military operations do not necessarily impose sufficient pressure on the adversary to force a decision to subjugate itself to US foreign policy.⁴⁹ Arguably, Saddam Hussein yielded to UN demands and US threats in February 1998, but soon after US forces were reduced in the theater, Saddam Hussein again refused UN weapons inspectors to operate in Iraq under UN directives.⁵⁰ Secondly, cruise missile strikes have limited impact on a nation pursuing fundamental national interests. Deliberate attacks against a sovereign state is a security issue, and by nature, one of vital national interest. Last years attacks against Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan have not forced a change in either country stated political objectives.⁵¹ The risk involved in conducting limited military strikes varies depending on your perspective. From a US perspective, limited strikes are considered a relatively low risk form of military operations because of the technological capability of the cruise missile and other forms of precision weapons. For the adversary, limited strikes do

threaten valuable facilities and equipment. The immediate risk associated with a US strike is significantly higher for the adversary than the US. From a US perspective, it is intended to be that way, but when the adversary is pursuing a vital national interest, the risk associated with a US directed limited strike becomes a matter of endurance and perseverance. The US has pursued military options with limited risk with increasing frequency for the past several years and is expected to continue to pursue this form of diplomacy even with evidence to the contrary.⁵² The third aspect is the realization that if limited strikes do not force an adversary to make a decision to comply, there is an understanding that the strategic initiative is held by the adversary. Unless ground forces, or other more deliberate form of military response, are introduced into the theater of operations, the adversary is only required to endure the limited strikes and therefore driving the timeline and conditions for further negotiations.⁵³ Although limited strikes appear to be operationally offensive in nature, diplomatically, they can readily seed the initiative to the adversary.⁵⁴

Viewing limited strikes as an ineffective means of coercion is only the first part of the diplomatic problem. The second part of the diplomatic problem is the issue of strategic will. Just because the US directs a limited cruise missile strike as part of an escalated effort against an adversary does not demonstrate a sense of strong strategic will. The reality is just the opposite. When the US employs cruise missiles to conduct a limited military strike the perception is that the strategic will of the US is relatively low. This is directly linked to the fact that normally limited strikes are used in pursuit of objectives that less than vital interest to the nation.⁵⁵ This aspect coupled with the administration's aversion to casualties and collateral damage sends an important message

to the adversary. The message to the adversary is that when the US uses limited cruise missile strikes, the US lacks the will to engage in an operation requiring more than precision guided munitions because the objective is not vital to the nation and a perceived aversion to sustaining casualties.⁵⁶ The adversary may interpret the lack of US strategic will as a perceived advantage.

In applying the three case studies to the defined criteria, the analysis shows that diplomatic effectiveness suffers primarily for two reasons. Specific to the actions relating to Iraq, negotiations and other diplomatic efforts to coerce Saddam Hussein into complying with UN sanctions fail on two accounts. First, the driving force to use limited military strikes against Iraq demonstrates a failure in the diplomatic efforts to convince the Iraqi leadership to comply. Second, when military force was used the result of the operation forced a reaction in direct contrast to the intent of the operation. National prestige and credibility suffered greatly when the justification for the attack against the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan was questioned and eventually proved invalid.⁵⁷ There will always be a relationship between diplomacy and military operations. Military operations in the pursuit of national interests and vital national interest not only directly contribute to attaining national security objectives, but also enhance diplomatic effectiveness. Military operations as a result of failed diplomatic efforts intended to coerce or punish rarely succeed.

The most important aspects relating to the diplomatic study of limited military strikes is that historically, limited strikes are ineffective as a means of political coercion or punishment. Limited strikes fail because the limited effect of the operation cannot impose sufficient pressure on the adversary to force a decision. In fact, limited strikes

seed the strategic initiative to the adversary. The adversary drives the timeline on when and how peace negotiations will commence. Additionally, limited strikes demonstrate to the adversary the lack of US will to commit to a protracted conflict or higher risk operation where sustaining US casualties becomes a real possibility. Time and commitment are on the side of the adversary placing the US at a distinct disadvantage. Operational planners are forced to work within the framework of the operation outlined under political considerations. Historically speaking, limited strikes following failed diplomatic efforts will tend to only frustrate the overall situation and potentially limit the opportunity for potential future options.⁵⁸

The informational instrument of national power is intrinsically related to the other three instruments. All other government operations depend in some way on information operations. As stated earlier, this analysis focuses on the development of domestic perceptions as a measure of success. The US realizes that making clear and honest expressions of intent and motives can generate public support and good will domestically and abroad.⁵⁹ When applicable, this analysis will discuss other aspects relating to information operations and the development of perceptions.

Information operations are so vital to our country that every US government agency is involved in information operations in some form. Because of the broad application of information operations, there is no single agency responsible for generating information or for applying the informational instrument of power in pursuit of national objectives.⁶⁰ Similar to diplomacy, information operations conducted effectively produce conditions favorable to the state. One aspect of information operations is the development of perceptions to gain domestic support. This analysis studies the

perception development events relating to the case studies. While the analysis uses domestic perception development as the measure of success, the impact of the limited military strikes on adversarial perception development is worthy of discussion. This portion of the analysis discusses the relative ambivalent domestic attitude of the US public toward the recent employment of cruise missiles. Beyond the development of domestic perception, this analysis identifies two other implications relating to limited military strikes and the conduct of information operations.

Although news of US military forces positioning in the Persian Gulf preparing for military operations against Iraq is still covered extensively by the media, is there a change in the American public attitude about these strikes? Have Americans become ambivalent toward military action and if so why? After reviewing the media coverage of the three case studies, it appears that Americans are becoming accustomed to frequent limited military strikes.⁶¹ Several media sources suggest that the main reason for the ambivalent attitude is because in the last three attacks no American lives were lost and the sense of risk is reduced.⁶² American military, science and industrial communities have successfully produced a weapon with the capability of conducting limited military strikes with minimal risk to American service members. The result is some suggest, that American expectation of military operations is that they are of short duration and conducted with minimum carnage.⁶³ This study does not suggest that in order to be informationally effective military operations should include loss of service member's lives in order to heighten public interest. The implication to the operational planner is the expectation that limited military strikes will generate minimal public interest and along with that ambivalent public support so long as the risk and resultant cost remains

minimal.

Beyond the original scope of this portion of the study, two other implications became relevant to the discussion of information analysis. While the American public may be ambivalent toward limited military strikes, the other impression is that cruise missile strikes show a lack of political resolve, undefined political objectives, and malfunctioning foreign policy.⁶⁴ The suggestion that military options are being pursued is a reflection of failing foreign policy, poor structure and definition of political objectives, and a lack of political resolve is a common theme among the resources associated with the three case studies.⁶⁵ Another aspect of limited military strikes associated with information operations is the concept that US Tomahawk strikes will somehow degrade the popularity of an adversarial national leader.⁶⁶ Stemming from the discussion of the diplomatic intent of limited military strikes is to coerce adversaries, is the idea that strikes undermine the popularity of the national leader. There is no proof that limited military strikes are effective at degrading the popularity of an adversarial national leader. Several resources suggest the opposite is true.⁶⁷

Based on the resources relating to the three case studies, domestic public opinion was basically unaffected by the recent limited military strikes against Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan. There is no documentation recounting a surge in public support or disdain for any of the three operations. This is largely attributed to the relative low risk of the operation and low cost in human lives. Several sources purported that the timing of all three operations were related to problems the President was facing domestically.⁶⁸ Although there is no direct proof that the cruise missile strikes were timed to distract the American public from presidential domestic problems, there were numerous resources

from various media disciplines that suggested that the President used the military operations for political gain.⁶⁹

When developing a limited military strike, operational planners can expect little interest from the American public unless the political leaders conduct a supporting information campaign intended to generate public support or at least curb public resistance to the operation. As long as the operation is conducted relatively swiftly and without loss of American life, public opinion is expected to remain ambivalent. The suggestion that limited strikes is a sign of failing foreign policy should lead the planner to the understanding that military operations so closely tied to political objectives will lead to the expectation that political leadership will employ great limits and constraints on the conduct and scope of the operation. The details of this discussion follows in the analysis of the military aspects of limited strikes.

Similar to the discussion of the diplomatic implications of limited military strikes, the analysis of the military as an instrument of national power provides a great deal of insight to the implications of cruise missile employment. The resources available to this portion of the study are as nearly as abundant as for the diplomatic analysis. While a study of the planning associated with these operations would better serve the military planner in preparing him for developing future contingencies, the intent of this analysis is to remain on a strategic orientation. Therefore the study discusses only those military aspects that have strategic implications that must be understood and appreciated by the operational planner.

The military as an instrument of national power embodies the nation's weapons and equipment, trained manpower, organizations, doctrines, industrial base, and

sustainment capacity.⁷⁰ Of the four instruments of national power, the military is the most expensive, and physical.⁷¹ The military instrument directly relates to and influences the other instruments of national power, and is capable of conducting a variety of operations from direct military operations to deliberate show of force in pursuit of national objectives. The US military's primary responsibility is to fight and win the nation's wars, but is capable and readily used for a variety of other operations.⁷² All military operations potentially have strategic implications, but it is the limited military strike that is the focus of this study. Specifically, limited strikes using cruise missiles appear to share many of the same characteristics as air strikes. In developing a limited strike, the operational planner must consider developing an operation that remains within the political limitation and constraints and still achieve the stated political objective. This analysis discusses the challenges of developing this type of operation and attempts to highlight the strategic considerations associated with conducting limited military strikes.

The primary concept that relates to the military implications of limited strikes is the idea that between two nations the political objectives vary in terms of importance and that difference has an effect on the conflict. Political objectives may be of vital interest of a state engaged in a conflict and not of vital interest to another. That difference in importance affects the development and conduct of a conflict. This is very often the case when discussing limited military strikes. The concept of relative importance is so fundamental to the objective of this study that before discussing the content of the resources related to the case studies, a review of a basis for this theoretical concept is necessary. Clausewitz, in his book on war plans, discusses the calculus involved in determining the amount of effort necessary to achieve a military and political aim. He

identifies the government's strength of will, their character and abilities as the three conditions that introduce uncertainty in developing military operational plans.⁷³ The relative importance of the objective is a key factor in the relationship between states in conflict. Geoffrey Blainey, in his book *The Causes of War*, discusses in more detail the factors contributing to a nation's willingness and ability to pursue national objectives.⁷⁴ For the purpose of the analysis, this study uses the term 'issue salience' for the remainder of the monograph to describe the concept of relative importance. Issue salience is a term found in Social Psychology to define the relative importance, both internally and externally, of an issue as it relates to common groups.⁷⁵ It is issue salience that drives both the political and military aspects of attaining national objectives. The challenge for operational planners is that limited strikes, by virtue of their limited effort and resultant limited effects, are characteristically employed to achieve objectives that are of less than national interest or at least less than the threshold to offer US lives up in the process. Conversely, limited US strikes are typically of vital national interest to the adversary.

Applying the concept of issue salience to the case studies, the political objectives associated with limited strikes are less than of national interest to the US, but to Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan the attacks are of vital national interest.⁷⁶ From a US perspective, the scope of these attacks demonstrates the level of risk and commitment the US is willing to pursue in achieving these objectives. While Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan were not forced to militarily respond, the US attacks generated an aggressive will against US imposition.⁷⁷ Also from a military aspect, these adversarial countries are not required to militarily respond to US limited strikes but only need to endure them in

order to undermine the US's ability to achieve political objectives.⁷⁸ As discussed in the diplomatic analysis, military actions become effective when the level of commitment and risk is commensurate with the stated objective.⁷⁹ The fact that cruise missiles are becoming more popular in the US conduct of limited military strikes demonstrates lack of willingness to risk national resources to achieve political objectives.⁸⁰ While there are more accurate and effective means of engaging a target or means which send the message of commitment of the nation, Tomahawk cruise missiles are popular weapons because of the desire to avoid sustaining US casualties over an objective of limited importance.⁸¹ This desire to avoid casualties extends to the US's adversaries as well. The National Security Strategy states that the US military will, whenever possible, conduct operations within a manner to avoid US and adversarial casualties and limit collateral damage.⁸² This stated limitation naturally drives the planners toward the use of cruise missiles when other weapons could be more effective both operationally and economically.

In the course of achieving limited political objectives, it is the operational planner that must deal with the consequences of issue salience in developing limited strike options. Unless the objective is of national interest, any solution involving limited strikes most likely include the use of cruise missiles. The operational planner must work through the differences between the military requirements for attaining the objectives and the political desire to conduct low risk form of war. The military operational planner is constrained by the requirement for a low risk operation that avoids casualties and sustains limited collateral damage. The US will continue to use cruise missiles even when there is other more efficient and economical means available. The dilemma for operational planners is the search for a military solution that achieves the political objective and is

commensurate with the cost and risk involved in conducting the operation while remaining within the political constraints placed on the operation by the political leadership.

Of the four instruments of national power, the study of the economic implications is the greatest challenging to this analysis because of the relatively limited resources directly addressing the subject. Domestic and international economies influence foreign policy and therefore relevant to this study. Relative to the other instruments of national power, the effects of limited military strikes on domestic and international economies takes longer to recognize. Operational planners must be aware of the economic implications due to the direct ties to the diplomatic aspects of treaties and negotiations. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan made this statement regarding the international economy and military operations:

The growing interdependence of the international economy means that a military threat to the vital interests of one nation often will threaten the interests of other nations as well. Combined action is a logical response. At the same time, cooperation will maximize the power that can be brought to bear against an aggressor. The benefits of having allies can only increase as each of our countries reduces the size of its armed forces.⁸³

Very few of the resources reviewed in this study directly contributed developing an understanding of the implications of limited military strikes. The lack of direct information and after conducting a review of the domestic market activities of the previous year, a conclusion could be drawn that limited military strikes have little impact on at least the domestic economy. While there is very little evidence suggesting that limited military strikes have positive or negative influence on the economy, one event did occur that warrants discussion. Following failed UN attempts to force Iraqi compliance of the post Gulf War concessions for the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction

research and development capability, economic sanctions were place on the country intended to raise the level of hardship and force compliance. In numerous articles, it appears that the Iraqi populous has suffered little as a result of the economic sanctions.⁸⁴ Beyond the sanctions, the recent limited strikes caused little to disrupt the Iraqi domestic economy due to the limitations and constraints placed on the operation.⁸⁵ While the sanctions have done little to coerce the Iraqi government to abide to UN resolutions, it (the Iraqi government) has used the last two limited strikes as an opportunity to renegotiate economic sanctions.⁸⁶ Since the last strike in December 1998, the Iraqi government demanded an expansion of their oil exports to approximately 10.4 billion annually as part of the agreement allowing UN inspectors to return. The sale of this oil is intended for humanitarian goods, but because of the limited impact of the UN sanctions, it is suggested that the revenue from the oil sales is being used to finance Saddam's weapons development programs.⁸⁷

The implication for the operational planner is that the threat or use of limited strikes provides the adversary with an opportunity to negotiate for improved economic conditions because of sympathy after a punitive attack. Arguably this implication more directly relates to diplomacy and negotiations because the opening of negotiations allows the adversary to demand any number of conditions to his benefit. Still it is important for the operational planner anticipate this event to determine the strategic affects as it relates to current negotiations with the adversary and ongoing diplomatic efforts with countries sharing similar interests. Furthermore, improved economic conditions for the adversary tend to undermine the most political and military objectives.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following conclusions outline the implications of the use of cruise missiles as a form of limited military strikes to operational planners. The general discussion of limits and constraints to operational planners leads the conclusion. That discussion is followed by a review of strategic implications of cruise missiles use based on the analysis of the instruments of national power. The final element of this chapter is a discussion addresses the limits, constraints and issues operational planners should be aware of when faced with developing a limited strike contingency.

This analysis identifies the characteristics of cruise missile strikes that tend to constrain and limit operational planners in developing limited strike options. The political leadership characteristically direct limited strikes because of failed diplomatic efforts in the pursuit of foreign policy. Limited strikes are employed to persuade or coerce a foreign government to comply with stated US policy. By the nature of this form of military response, limited strikes are characteristically employed to achieve a political objective that is less than of vital interest to the nation. Characteristically, cruise missile strikes support the perception that the US is politically averse to sustaining US casualties, adversary casualties, and collateral damage.

The first constraint operational planners face is the fact that they are participating in developing a military plan that is not a matter of national survival or prosperity; however, for the adversary, any military action conducted against their country maybe of national survival. The difference in issue salience between the US and the adversary

tends to lead to the conclusion that the adversary holds the strategic advantage based on will and commitment alone. The reality is that the US is capable of conducting a military strike with relative minimum risk because the level of national wealth, treasure, and resources far exceeds that of all other countries. This analysis shows that although the US can conduct limited cruise missile strikes with minimal risk, the effectiveness of these strikes are minimized because of the level of commitment and will of the adversary. Any US adversary willing to absorb a limited strike and committed to not being coerced and subjugated to US foreign policy will retain the initiative and advantage in the situation. Similarly, the act of cruise missile strikes as well as conventional air strikes seed the initiative from the US political leadership to the leadership of the adversary. The adversary retains the luxury of dictating the timeline for the action and determines when a decision will be made and under what conditions peace agreements will be established so long as he remains willing absorb and ignore the attacks.

Along a similar line of thought, limited military operations tend to have greater political directives and constraints that limit operational planners in developing comprehensive, functional and effective military solutions. Political leaders imposing constraints on military operations do not necessarily understand the strategic implications of limited cruise missile strikes. Although morally obligated to keep the American public apprised of the costs and impact of such operations, political leaders seldom address the impact of military operations both domestically and internationally. It is the operational planner that should keep the military leadership apprised of the effectiveness of limited strikes, based on historical evidence, and continue to challenge the legitimacy for the military action.

To gain an appreciation for the strategic implications of cruise missile employment, this analysis used the instruments of national power as examination criteria. This criterion is pertinent to this analysis because the instruments of national power represent those resources and actions available to a nation to conduct normal operations. While the instruments of national power are not all encompassing, they allow for a strategic analysis of cruise missiles employment as a form of limited strikes. There are many other possible combinations of criteria that would be suitable for this analysis, but for the purpose of providing a definable and generally recognized concept, this study selected the instruments of national power. Following is the restatement of the analysis using the selected criteria.

Diplomatically, limited strikes, specifically air strikes to which cruise missile employment is akin, are ineffective as a means of persuading a foreign government to subjugate itself to US policy. Limited cruise missile strikes are diplomatically ineffective for three reasons. First, limited strikes are intended to have limited effects and therefore cannot impose sufficient pressure upon an adversary to force a decision. Next, air strikes, because they do not force a decision, are inherently ineffective against a country pursuing fundamental national interests. The third reason why cruise missile strikes are diplomatically ineffective is that the strike seeds the initiative of the situation to the adversary. Cruise missile strikes show a lack of willingness to commit the resources necessary to force a decision and allows the adversary to determine the timeline and conditions of all decisions except for the US's decision to stop the strike. An additional diplomatic aspect of this form of limited military strike is that it internationally demonstrates a lack of US will toward the issue and an aversion to enduring US

casualties. Limited military strikes following failed diplomatic efforts tend to frustrate the situation beyond the original point of complexity and potentially limit the opportunity for future operations. This aspect undermines our diplomatic effectiveness and may provide the adversary with a strategic advantage.

The information analysis demonstrates that the implications of cruise missile employment do not support the development of favorable perceptions in pursuit of national objectives. Limited cruise missile strikes show a lack of political resolve, undefined political objectives, and malfunctioning foreign policy. In the pursuit of developing the perception that the adversarial populous is governed by weak or hostile leadership, cruise missile strikes have not proven effective in degrading the popularity of an adversarial national leader. Lastly, from an informational standpoint, the US political leadership has actively pursued efforts to develop favorable perceptions to generate support for military operations but fail in efforts to keep the American public apprised of the cost and impact involved in using military force.

Strategically, the primary implication to operational planners identified in the military analysis is the concept of issue salience. The most significant aspect of developing a limited military strike contingency is the aspect of relative importance of the issue among the belligerents. As discussed earlier, the US selects limited military strikes when the objective does not warrant the level of risk and commitment necessary to justify more traditional military operations such as the commitment of ground troops into the area of operations. Typically, from the US position, the objective or issue is not of vital interest to the nation; however, to the adversary, the act of limited strike can be considered an act of war. Regardless, limited strikes are a matter of survival to the

adversary. Fundamentally, military operations require the level of commitment be commensurate with the achievement of the objective. Operational planners are faced with the dilemma of developing a military operation which political objective is not of national interest, and limited in scope by the aversion to casualties and collateral damage. To be militarily successful, the operational planner must have the commitment and support of the political leadership and have the necessary resources available to achieve the designated mission. The conflict of commitment and risk with the military requirements to accomplish the mission within the designated limitations of the operation places great difficulty on the operational planner to develop an effective and efficient plan.

While the information about the case studies directly linking the cruise missile employment to economic implications, it is important to consider that the US economic system is highly integrated into the international market. While limited strikes against a country that the US has limited or no direct trade agreements does not mean that there are not economic implications related to the strike. The reality is that the second and third order economic effects associated with a limited military strike may impact on the US economic system or the markets of our international trading partners. This study identified one aspect relating specifically to the economic analysis. Along with the diplomatic discussion of peace negotiations following a limited strike, an adversary maintains the initiative in negotiations and maybe provides an opportunity gain favorable economic conditions for the country. It is highly possible that this opportunity may degrade continuing efforts by the US to achieve the original political objective.

While this analysis may not have introduced any new ideas or concepts, this study may only serve to articulate those challenges already realized by operational planners. Still it is of relative importance to review the facts relating to this subject and reiterate those fundamental principles associated with this form of military operation. *Tomahawk Diplomacy* will remain in the American lexicon as long as cruise missile technology is perceived advantageous to the American military and US interests. Eventually, this term will be updated when another form of weapon with capabilities that exceed those of our peers and adversaries is acquired into the US arsenal. What will not change are the strategic implications of their use and the challenges that operational planners will continue to face. Until then, operational planners must contend with the current capabilities of our weapons technology and the political interest in conducting limited military strikes to achieve political objectives. Operational planners are constrained by the requirement for risk and casualty avoidance, and limited collateral damage. The US will continue to use cruise missiles even when there is other more efficient and economical means available.

Operational planners must remain aware of the limitations of limited strikes, specifically cruise missile strikes, and what types of political objectives they can and cannot achieve. Understanding the politically weak position this form of military operations provides US political leadership and the advantages provided by the adversary is also essential for the operational planner to understand and appreciate. When developing limited strike contingencies, operational planners should remind military commanders of the proof that limited strikes are ineffective as a form of persuasion. The most important strategic aspect of developing a limited military strike is the concept of

issue salience. Operational planners must understand the concept and apply that understanding during the mission analysis phase of the decision making process in order to develop courses of action that challenge the adversary's national will. The dilemma for operational planners is the search for a military solution that achieves the political objective and is commensurate with the cost and risk involved in conducting the operation while remaining within the political constraints placed on the operation by the political leadership. The practical challenge is developing solutions that achieve the political objectives while balancing cost and risk with the value of the stated political objective.

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